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The Role of Ethics Audits in Improving Management 
Systems and Practices: An Empirical Examination of 
Management-Based Regulation of Law Firms 
Abstract.  For decades, legal malpractice experts have urged lawyers to 
implement risk management measures.  To assist law firms in doing so, legal 
malpractice insurers have provided audit services and self-audit materials.  Under the 
Australian regulatory regime, incorporated legal practices are required to complete a 
self-assessment process and to report on the firm’s compliance with ten objectives of 
sound law practice.  Using management-based principles, this Article discusses steps to 
take to encourage ethics audits “to merge good ethics and good business” in the U.S.  
Author.  Susan Saab Fortney serves as the Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished 
Professor of Legal Ethics and Director of the Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at 
Maurice Deane School of Law at Hofstra University.  Professor Fortney has 
conducted various empirical studies on law firm ethics and liability.  She works with 
numerous bodies including The Professional Lawyer, the State Bar of Texas Committee 
on the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, and the National Conference of 
Bar Examiners Committee that drafts the Multistate Professional Responsibility 
Examination.  Texas Lawyer newspaper selected her as one of the Thirty Extraordinary 
Women in Texas Law.  In 2010, the Texas Bar Foundation awarded her the Lola 
Wright Foundation Award for outstanding public service in advancing legal ethics.  
She is a member of the American Law Institute, the Texas Bar Foundation, and the 
American Bar Foundation. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
On a weekly basis, articles in both legal newspapers and the popular 
press question the relevance, cost, and application of legal education.1  
This discussion adds another chapter to discourse on the role of law school 
and legal educators.  In the debate on the proper focus of law schools and 
legal educators, Judge Harry Edwards of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit challenged law schools and law firms to 
examine the “disjunction” between the legal academy and the legal 
profession.2  Judge Edwards questioned the emphasis on abstract theory, 
arguing that the principal mission of law schools should be to produce 
“scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use.”3  
According to Judge Edwards, “‘practical’ scholarship . . . is not wholly 
doctrinal.”4  Rather he noted that a “‘practical scholar’ gives due weight to 
cases, statutes, and other authoritative texts, but also employs theory to 
criticize doctrine, to resolve problems that doctrine leaves open, and to 
propose changes in the law or in systems of justice.”5 
At the time that Judge Edwards referred to the “disjunction,” Judge 
Edwards may not have been aware of Ted Schneyer’s seminal article, 
 
1. See TANIA KARAS, LAW SCHOOLS BOLSTER CLINIC OFFERINGS, N.Y. L.J. 5 (2013) 
(describing how New York law schools are using clinics to help students develop practical lawyering 
skills and prepare them for jobs); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education:  Rethinking the Problem, 
Reimaging the Reforms, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 437, 438 (2013) (providing a scholarly analysis of the 
concerns related to the future of legal education); Ethan Bronner, A Call for Drastic Changes in 
Educating New Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/02/11/us/lawyers-call-for-drastic-change-in-educating-new-lawyers.html?_r=0 (referring to 
testimony presented at hearings conducted by the American Bar Association’s Task Force of the 
Future of Legal Education); Randall T. Shepard, Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, A.B.A. 
CENTER FOR PROF. RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
taskforceonthefuturelegaleducation.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (indicating that the ABA Task 
Force on the Future of Legal Education is “charged with making recommendations to the [ABA] on 
how law schools, the ABA, and other groups and organizations can take concrete steps to address 
issues concerning the economics of legal education and its delivery”). 
2. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (expressing his concern that the legal education system 
and the legal profession are growing in opposite directions).  Subsequently, the Michigan Law Review 
published a symposium issue focusing on the subject of the growing disjunction.  See generally 
Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1921 (1993) (responding to Judge Harry Edwards’s article). 
3. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992). 
4. Id. at 35. 
5. See id. (noting that a good legal scholarship is not one dimensional); see also Richard A. 
Danner, Oh, The Treatise!, 111 MICH. L. REV. 821, 822 (2013) (pointing out that in recent years, 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy have also questioned the value of purely theoretical legal 
scholarship). 
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Professional Discipline in Law Firms.6  The article critically examined 
problems facing practitioners and proposed changes to improve the 
effectiveness of regulation of lawyers.7  Arguing that the professional 
regulation should include the discipline of law firms, Professor Schneyer 
analyzed how limiting discipline to individual lawyers does not address 
various ethical breaches that arise from inadequate organizational controls 
and deficiencies in the ethical infrastructure of law firms.8  Professor 
Schneyer first used the term “ethical infrastructure” to refer to “a law firm’s 
organization, policies, and operating procedures . . . that cut[] across 
particular lawyers and tasks.”9  Professor Schneyer suggested that “[t]he 
chief reason to allow disciplinary authorities to proceed directly against law 
firms is prophylaxis—the promotion of firm practices that prevent 
wrongdoing by individual lawyers.”10  As discussed below, Professor 
Schneyer’s work on the discipline and ethical infrastructure of law firms 
has influenced lawyers, academics, jurists, and regulators around the 
world.11 
Following the publication of Professor Schneyer’s article, the high court 
in New York revised the state’s professional conduct rules to provide for 
discipline of law firms as entities.12  Although few firms have been 
disciplined, the possibility of entity discipline should motivate firm leaders 
to devote time and resources to implement policies and procedures to 
promote ethical conduct.13 
In focusing attention on the connection between ethical conduct and 
 
6.  Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–35 (1992).  See generally Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for 
Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1991) (studying the regulation of lawyers in the current legal 
climate). 
7. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13 (1991) 
(proposing the creation of ethical norms for law firms as a whole, rather than for individual lawyers). 
8. Professor Schneyer uses five well-published incidents involving large law firms to illustrate 
how misconduct may not be attributable to the conduct of individual lawyers.  Id. at 4–5. 
9. Id. at 10. 
10. Id. at 14. 
11. The Festschrift for Ted Schneyer examined his many contributions, focusing on Lawyer 
Regulation for the 21st Century.  See Bruce A. Green, Foreword—The Legal Ethics Scholarship of Ted 
Schneyer: The Importance of Being Rigorous, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 365 (2011) (examining Schneyer’s 
many contributions to lawyer regulation in the 21st century). 
12. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2013); see also Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional 
Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2 
(2002) (providing background on firm discipline proposals). 
13. See Thomas D. Morgan, The Rise of Institutional Law Practice, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1005, 
1005–07 (2012) (examining the rise in institutional practice and the importance of organizational 
controls). 
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firm systems and controls, Professor Schneyer’s work may have also 
contributed to regulators’ and jurists’ willingness to rely on the state 
versions of ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1, which requires 
that a partner in a law firm “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm 
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the 
firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”14  Although there are 
relatively few disciplinary cases citing Rule 5.1(a), opinions increasingly 
refer to the importance of firm managers making reasonable efforts to 
ensure that all lawyers in the firm comply with the ethics rules.15 
In the United States, other scholars relied on Professor Schneyer’s work 
that called for law firms to focus more on fortifying their ethical 
infrastructure.16  Some examined the implementation and impact of ethics 
systems and controls.17  A few have called for more research examining the 
role of ethical infrastructure.18 
Outside the United States, commentators and bar leaders joined the 
chorus by seriously considering the role of ethical infrastructure in 
influencing lawyer conduct.19  This examination has informed regulatory 
changes in both the United Kingdom and Australia. 
In the United Kingdom, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) has 
shifted to outcomes-based regulation that focuses on high-level principles 
and outcomes that drive the provision of legal services to consumers.20  
 
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2013); see Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My 
Partner’s Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 329, 348–58 (1995) (providing a 
discussion of Model Rule 5.1(a) and a partner’s duty to monitor or supervise other firm lawyers). 
15. See Joan C. Rogers, Law Partners and Managers Must Be Active Overseers of Colleagues’ 
Conduct, 28 ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT, CURRENT REPORTS 71 (Feb. 1, 
2012), available at www.bna.com/law-partners-managers-n12884907572/ (commenting on the 
responsibility of law firm managers and cases applying ABA Model Rules 5.1(a), 5.3, and the 
comparable Restatement of Law Governing Lawyer sections). 
16. See Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. REV. 786, 
788–89 (2009) (recommending that firms adopt procedures to promote internal reporting of ethics 
concerns and providing formal protections against retaliation for reporting). 
17. See Susan Saab Fortney & Jett Hanna, Fortifying a Firm’s Ethical Infrastructure: Avoiding 
Legal Malpractice Claims Based on Conflicts of Interest, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 669, 690 (2002) 
(describing the various systems that firms employ to check the quality of their ethics systems). 
18. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructures in 
Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 693 (2002) 
(explaining the importance of having a sound ethical infrastructure in place). 
19. See, e.g., Christine Parker et al, The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law 
Firms: Values, Policy and Behavior, 31 U. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 158, 159 (2008) (stating how 
ethical behavior effects the entire firm and not just individual lawyers). 
20. See Outcomes-Focused Regulation, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.sra.org.uk/ 
solicitors/freedom-in-practice/outcomes-focused-regulation.page (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (noting 
that outcomes-focused regulation “replaces a detailed and prescriptive rulebook with a targeted, risk-
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The SRA Authorization Rules now require firms to appoint compliance 
personnel to oversee risk management and governance matters.21  These 
compliance officers are responsible for ensuring that their firms implement 
systems and controls to enable firm members to meet the requirements set 
forth in the Solicitors Handbook.22  In describing effective compliance 
arrangements, the SRA urges solicitors to consider the infrastructure of the 
firm.23 
In adopting a form of management-based firm regulation, Australian 
jurisdictions have taken a somewhat different approach in addressing 
organizational controls and consumer protection.24  Legislators in the state 
of New South Wales (NSW) in Australia first took the pioneering step of 
integrating the concept of “ethical infrastructure” into the statute, allowing 
legal practitioners to incorporate their law practices with no restrictions on 
non-lawyer ownership.25 
 
based approach concentrating on the standards of service to consumers”); see also Susan Saab Fortney, 
Assessing How Lawyers Keep Their Own Houses Clean: Baseline Report on Outcomes-Focused Regulation, 
JOTWELL (Feb. 21, 2013), http://legalpro.jotwell.com/assessing-how-lawyers-keep-their-own-
houses-clean-baseline-report-on-outcomes-focused-regulation/ (reviewing an extensive report on the 
outcomes-based regulation in the UK). 
21. See Outcomes-Focused Regulation at a Glance, SOLIC. REG. AUTHORITY, 
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/OFR/ofr-quick-guide.page (updated Oct. 10, 
2011) (explaining that the new method allows for greater flexibility while also providing better care to 
consumers). 
22. See id. (detailing the requirements and responsibilities of the compliance officers). 
23. Id.; see Gerard Starkey, Law Firm Name First Compliance Officers for New Regulatory 
Regime, LEGAL WK. (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/news/2235368/law-
firms-name-first-compliance-officers-as-sra-pushes-on-with-new-regulatory-regime (stating that 
compliance officers are “the key SRA contact point at their law firms, taking responsibility for 
systems and controls and ensuring risk is appropriately managed”); see also Compliance Officers, THE 
L. SOC’Y (May 2, 2013), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/articles/compliance-officers/ 
(explaining “the role of compliance officers”). 
24. See Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices—A New Era in the 
Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 671 
(2004) (detailing the legislation that made the new management-based firm regulations possible).  See 
generally Steve Mark, Regulating For Professionalism: The New South Wales Approach, OFF. OF THE 
LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSIONER (NSW) (Aug. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/events/ethics_2020/steve_mark_posting.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing the potentially 
competing interests of regulation and professionalism). 
25. Steven Mark, Regulating For Professionalism: The New South Wales Approach, OFF. OF THE 
LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSIONER (NSW) 9–11 (Aug. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/events/ethics_2020/steve_mark_posting.authcheckdam.pdf.  Other states in Australia have 
enacted similar legislation requiring that incorporated firms implement AMS and appoint a legal 
practitioner director who becomes responsible for the firm’s ethical infrastructure.  See Incorporated 
Legal Practices and Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships, LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSION, http://www.lsc.qld. 
gov.au/compliance/incorporated-legal-practices/appropriate-management-systems (last visited Mar. 
19, 2014) (providing an overview of the regulatory framework in Queensland). 
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To allay concerns related to non-lawyer ownership and limited liability, 
the statute imposes a number of management and practice safeguards.26  
First, the incorporated legal practice (ILP) must appoint a legal 
practitioner director to be “generally responsible for the management of 
legal services provided” by the ILP.27  Second, the statute provides that the 
legal practitioner director must ensure that “appropriate management 
systems are implemented and maintained to enable the provision of those 
legal services in accordance with . . . obligations imposed by [law].”28 
Because the statute did not define “appropriate management systems” 
(AMS), Steve Mark, the Legal Services Commissioner for NSW, worked 
with various stakeholders to develop “ten objectives of sound legal 
practice.”29  The Office for the Legal Services Commissioner (LSC) also 
devised an “education toward compliance” approach in which the ILP 
must complete a self-assessment process (SAP).30  In this SAP, ILPs 
complete a Self-Assessment Form (SAF), reporting on their compliance 
with each of the ten objectives.31 
Professor Ted Schneyer credits the NSW program with giving content 
to the term “ethical infrastructure” by “identifying ten types of recurring 
problems that infrastructure should be designed to prevent or at least 
mitigate.”32  Because the “education toward compliance” approach focuses 
 
26. Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with 
U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 2009 PROF. LAW. 13, 31 (referring to concerns related to 
non-lawyer ownership and limited liability). 
27. Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal Practices—A New Era in the 
Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 681 
(2004) (outlining the roles and responsibilities of the solicitor director). 
28. See id. at 686 (explaining the strict compliance regulations to which the practitioner 
director must adhere). 
29. See id. at 689–90 (listing the objectives of the education towards compliance strategy). 
30. See id. at 689 (stating that the ILPs must demonstrate that they have a program in place 
that is congruent with the ten objectives previously described). 
31. See id. at 691 (explaining that the SAF requires the legal practitioner director to evaluate 
firm practices and rate management systems using a template).  If the completed form indicates that a 
firm is non-compliant or partially compliant, a staff member with the LSC provides the ILP written 
guidance and requests confirmation of steps to achieve compliance.  See id. (recognizing that the self-
assessment form is a required element of the ILP review program); see also Susan Fortney & Tahlia 
Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and Thrive: A Study of the Australian 
Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 152, 152 (2012) (highlighting Tahlia 
Gordon’s contributions as the Research and Project Manager for the Office of the Legal Services 
Commissioner for NSW). 
32. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should Promote 
Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 576, 585 (2011).  
Professor Schneyer also expanded on the description of  “ethical infrastructure,” noting that it 
consists of “policies, procedures, systems, and structures—in short, the ‘measures’ that ensure lawyers 
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on prevention and mitigation, Professor Schneyer describes the NSW 
program as a prototype for “proactive, management based regulation.”33  
Unlike reactive regulation that disciplines lawyers for violating particular 
rules, the management-based objectives address the principles of sound 
practice.34  In addition, the SAF provides strategies to address concerns 
that commonly result in complaints against practitioners.35 
The proactive approach to regulation has captured the attention of a 
number of commentators and researchers.36  Notably, in 2008, Dr. 
Christine Parker conducted an empirical study assessing the impact of the 
NSW program on the number of complaints relating to ILPs.37  The 
study found that rate of complaints for ILPs went down by two-thirds after 
the ILP completed its initial self-assessment.38  Another noteworthy 
finding was that the rate of complaints for ILPs that completed the SAP 
was one-third of the number of complaints registered against non-
incorporated legal practices.39  The researchers recommended further 
investigation utilizing other research methods because the rate of 
complaints largely reflected consumer service issues and did not address 
other ethics concerns, such as duties to the court and other ethical issues 
that are of less concern to clients.40 
To obtain more data on the impact of the AMS and the SAP and to 
identify possible measures to improve management-based regulation of 
firms, I conducted a mixed method study in 2012, combining a survey 
 
in their firm comply with their ethical duties and that non-lawyers associated with the firm behave in 
a manner consistent with the lawyers’ duties.”  Id. 
33. Id. at 584. 
34. Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and 
Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 152, 
161 (2012) (providing fluid guidelines as opposed to specific rules that were previously used). 
35. See id. at 162 (explaining the rudimentary nature of the self-assessment form); see also Self-
Assessment Process, OFF. OF LEGAL SERVS. COMMISSIONER, http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/ 
agdbasev7wr/olsc/documents/pdf/self_assessment_form_january2014. pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 
2014) (providing access to the SAF). 
36. See Christine E. Parker, Tahlia Gordon, & Steve A. Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethics 
Management: An Empirical Assessment of the Regulation of Incorporated Legal Practices in NSW, 37 J.L. 
SOC’Y 466, 469 (2010) (arguing that ethical regulation within the legal profession must focus on law 
firms at large rather than exclusively on individual lawyers). 
37. See id. at 466 (presenting an evaluation of the management-based regulation scheme). 
38. See id. at 483, 485 (analyzing the SAFs and complaints data relating to 620 ILPs). 
39. See id. at 488 (explaining that the improvement was “statistically significant at the highest 
level”).  On a third hypothesis that related to levels of implementation of AMS, the researchers found 
little evidence that the actual rating that firms gave themselves for implementation of management 
systems made a difference in the number of complaints.  See id. at 491 (emphasizing the important 
role that the self-assessment process has in reducing the complaints rates). 
40. See id. at 498 (suggesting areas of further research to better understand the results). 
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with interviews.  Another article analyzes survey findings related to the 
implementation and development of AMS, as well as the effects of the 
SAP.41  This Article draws on those findings, focusing on the value of 
ethics audits in improving ethical conduct by lawyers. 
Part I of this Article describes the hypotheses and methodology used in 
the study.  Part II summarizes pertinent survey findings relating to the 
effects of AMS and the SAP.  Part III identifies steps that can be taken to 
encourage lawyers and their firms to engage in self-assessment.  The 
conclusion explains the foundational role that ethics assessments can play 
in reducing lawyers’ liability while improving the delivery of legal services. 
PART I - RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
For the study, the primary research questions were: (1) what is the 
relationship between the self-assessment and the ethical norms, systems, 
conduct, and culture in firms, and (2) how can the SAP be improved?  To 
answer these questions, I conducted a mixed method study in 
collaboration with the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner for NSW 
(LSC). 
In phase one, I obtained survey data using an online questionnaire.42  
The questionnaire sought information on approaches, perspectives, effects, 
and experiences related to the AMS implementation and the SAP.43  The 
target group for the survey consisted of 356 ILPs with two or more 
solicitors.44  A total of 141 directors with ILPs completed the 
questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 39.6%.45  The respondents 
 
41. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive 
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
152, 155 (2012) (examining the relationship between self-assessment procedures and the ethical 
culture in firms). 
42. SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, QUESTIONNAIRE, at 1 
(2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal); see also Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting 
Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to 
Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 152, 168 (2012) (indicating that the 
questionnaire contained thirty-one multipart items, space for text entries, and a section for additional 
comments). 
43. SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, QUESTIONNAIRE, at 1 
(2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal). 
44. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive 
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
152, 168–69 (2012) (specifying that only ILPs that were incorporated between January 1, 2007 and 
January 1, 2011 were invited to participate in the survey). 
45. See id. at 168–70 (discussing the development of the methodology, the response rate, and 
bias). 
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represented firms of varying sizes.46 
In the second stage of the study, we interviewed directors from ILPs 
with two or more solicitors.47  Maxine Evers, Senior Lecturer at the 
University of Technology in Sydney, conducted approximately half of the 
interviews.  We systematically pulled the names of firms and invited 
designated directors from those firms to participate in interviews.48  
Interview questions allowed for follow-up on issues covered in the 
questionnaire.  The interviews also provided an opportunity to explore in 
more detail the directors’ experiences with implementing AMS and 
completing the SAP as well as their opinions on improving the SAP and 
the regulation of firms.49  Respondents were advised that the study was 
being conducted in cooperation with the LSC and were informed of steps 
taken to protect the anonymity of their responses.50 
PART II - SELECT SURVEY FINDINGS 
A number of survey items addressed the following question: What is the 
relationship between self-assessment and the ethical norms, systems, 
conduct, and culture in firms?51  One question specifically asked 
respondents to note the steps taken after the firm’s first completion of the 
SAP.  The majority (71%) indicated that they revised firm systems, 
policies, and procedures and 47% reported that they actually adopted new 
 
46. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 1 
(2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (reporting the following categories for respondent 
firms by size:  1-2 solicitors (10%), 3-9 solicitors (78%), 10-19 solicitors (7%), and 20 or more 
solicitors (5%)).  Geographically, the respondents were close to evenly divided between firms with 
home offices in Sydney and firms with home offices in other communities in NSW.  
47. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive 
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
152, 168 (2012) (explaining that limiting the study in this manner would yield “data on the impact 
of the AMS and SAP on firm dynamics”). 
48. We continued to systematically pull names and invite respondents until we had over forty 
individuals who agreed to be interviewed. 
49. Although each interviewer followed a four-page interview template, the session allowed for 
follow-up discussion of issues and concerns that arose during the interview. 
50. Steps included scrubbing transcripts so that they did not include any identifying 
information.  Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive 
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
152, 168 (2012). 
51. See, e.g., SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, QUESTIONNAIRE, 
at Question 12–13 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (asking what steps the interviewer 
took upon completion of the SAP and whether certain aspects of the firm culture changed as a 
result). 
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systems, policies, and procedures.52  Forty-two percent indicated that they 
“strengthened firm management” following the completion of the first 
SAF.53  For most steps taken by firms in connection with the SAP, there 
was no significant difference related to firm size and the steps taken.54  
Analyzed together, these results and others suggest that the SAP 
contributed to firms of all sizes taking steps to fortify the firms’ ethical 
infrastructures.55 
Results also indicate that the SAP was an educational experience for the 
majority of respondents.  Sixty-two percent indicated that they agreed or 
strongly agreed with the following statement: the self-assessment process 
“was a learning exercise that enabled our firm to improve client service.”56  
Only 15% disagreed or strongly disagreed.57  These responses and text 
entries indicate that the education toward compliance approach works in 
providing firm directors the incentives, tools, and authority to take steps to 
improve the delivery of legal services.  A smaller percentage of respondents 
noted that the SAP enhanced awareness of ethics issues.58 
To obtain additional information on the extent of the impact of the 
SAP, a multi-part inquiry asked respondents to rate impact on the 
following scale: (1) “no impact,” (2) “some impact,” and (3) “high 
impact.”59  For analysis purposes, I grouped the responses in four 
categories: management, client/professionalism concerns, ethics concerns, 
and firm dynamics.  The following graphic sets forth the average ratings 
for items in these categories.60 
 
52. Id. at Question 12.  
53. Id. 
54. See id. at Question 1, 12 (noting that this figure is based on a cross-tabulation of Questions 
1 and 12).  When it came to implementation of training following the self-assessment process, there 
was a trend in which larger firms reported that they implemented training more than smaller ones.  
Id. at Question 12. 
55. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive 
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
152, 173 (2012) (outlining various steps that firms reported taking following the first self-
assessment). 
56. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 
19 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (noting that 55% of respondents checked that 
they “agree” with the statement and 7% reported that they “strongly agree” with the statement). 
57. See id. at Question 19 (reporting that 11% of respondents checked that they “disagree” 
with the statement and 4% reported that they “strongly disagree” with the statement). 
58. See id. at Question 19 (reporting that approximately 45% of respondents “agree” or 
“strongly agree” that SAP enhanced ethics awareness). 
59. Id. at Question 13. 
60. See id. (indicating a trend in which directors at smaller firms reported that the self-
assessment process impacted supervision at a higher rate than that reported by directors at larger 
3 FORTNEY_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:06 AM 




As indicated by the results summarized in the graphic, the largest 
percentage of respondents reported that the greatest impact was on matters 
related to firm management and risk management, followed by impact on 
client service matters.  The respondents’ ratings of the impact on general 
ethics concerns and firm dynamics were lower.  These results can be 
attributed to the fact that the items covered in the SAF largely deal with 
practice management issues that commonly result in firm concerns related 
to client complaints, such as cost disclosure and fee recovery. 
Although many of the items covered in the SAF relate to proper 
conduct under applicable law, the aggregate results suggest that 
respondents did not perceive that the SAP impacted ethics conduct, 
leadership, and culture as much as management and client service issues.  
This conclusion is supported by other responses indicating that a smaller 
percentage of firms are implementing measures related to general ethics 
concerns, as opposed to measures and controls that the SAF expressly 
covers.61  Similarly, more respondents report that their firms implemented 
 
firms).  This is based on a cross-tabulation between the responses to Questions 1 and 13.  See id. 
(excluding this finding, there was no significant difference between the impact reported by 
respondents and firm size). 
61. For example, only 37% of the respondents indicated that their firms did not have a director 
or committee appointed to direct ethics initiatives.  Id. at Question 28.  By comparison, 76% of 
3 FORTNEY_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:06 AM 
124 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:112 
measures specifically described in the SAF, but a smaller number of 
respondents used controls not described in the SAF.62 
These results point to an overarching question related to the effect of 
the SAP.  Does the process contribute to serious examination of firm 
practices, policies, and systems, or does the SAP result in firms using the 
SAF as a checklist, simply implementing the specific practices, policies and 
procedures described in the SAF?  Even worse, does the SAP result in a 
meaningless box checking exercise in which directors simply go through 
the SAF checking that their firms are “compliant” without serious 
examination of firm practices?  In the survey, 12% of respondents agreed 
with the statement that the SAP amounted to meaningless “box ticking.”63 
In evaluating survey responses and interview results, directors’ 
experiences and perspectives appear to fall on a continuum.  At one end, a 
relatively small percentage of respondents may be simply checking boxes 
and reporting that their firms are compliant without actual review of firm 
policies.64  The mid-continuum point is represented by the large 
percentage of respondents who report that they used the SAF as a learning 
process to review and revise existing policies, as well as adopt new ones.65  
At a minimum, these firm representatives are addressing those matters that 
are expressly described in the SAF form.66  At the far end of the 
continuum are those firm respondents who have been inspired by the SAF 
to take management systems to the next level.67  These respondents 
recognize the business imperative in adopting management systems to 
 
respondents reported that their firms had appointed a director or committee to handle risk 
management.  Id. 
62. See id. at Question 24 (illustrating the fact that 92% of respondents indicated that their 
firms had a practice for verifying credentials and certifications of all practitioners, a supervisory 
control identified in the SAF).  On the other hand, only 66% reported that their firms made a regular 
practice of having a director (not involved in the representation) periodically review all current files.  
Id. 
63. See id. at Question 18 (finding that 66% of respondents disagreed that “SAP amounts to 
meaningless box ticking,” while 22% neither agreed nor disagreed). 
64. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive 
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
152, 170 (2012) (suggesting the existence of a potential bias in the survey because directors could be 
concerned about what their responses would reveal). 
65. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 
18 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (demonstrating that 55% of survey takers believed 
that the SAP was useful as a learning exercise). 
66. See id. (noting that 56% of respondents believed that adopting the AMS “reduced the 
firm’s professional liability of risk”). 
67. See id. (revealing that 7% of those surveyed strongly agreed that the SAP was a positive 
learning tool). 
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make their firms more competitive in attracting and retaining clients.68  A 
small group of respondents who recognize the value of management 
systems are going beyond the minimum required by the SAF and seeking a 
Quality Management Certification under the guidelines adopted by the 
International Organization for Standards.69  Firms might use such 
certifications to distinguish themselves for business development purposes. 
 PART III - INTEGRATING MANAGEMENT-BASED PRINCIPLES 
The research findings discussed above indicate that lawyers’ self-
assessment makes a real difference in educating lawyers by first evaluating 
their firm practices, and second, by developing systems.  As revealed by 
respondents’ reports of the impact of the SAP, the greatest impact was on 
firm management, risk management, and supervision.  The survey findings 
relating to the dramatic decrease in the number of complaints suggest that 
lawyers can reduce their exposure for liability for disciplinary complaints 
by evaluating firm practices and improving firm controls.70  These 
findings may capture the attention of some practitioners, contributing to 
them going through the SAP. 
Although the data is compelling, most practitioners may need 
additional incentives or a push to get them to devote the time to seriously 
examining firm processes.  In Australia, the regulatory implementation of 
legislation mandating that incorporated firms implement appropriate 
management systems requires designated practitioners to complete the 
SAP.71  Opinions reported in my study revealed that a number of the 
respondents questioned or even opposed being required to complete an 
 
68. See id. (showing that a total of 62% of respondents believed that the SAP enables their firm 
to improve client service). 
69. See id. at Question 14 (surveying benefits incurred by the SAP); see also Certification To ISO 
Management System Standard, INT’L. ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/ 
iso/home/standards/certification.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (describing some of the 
certifications that use the ISO standards and differentiating between ISO standards and autonomous 
certification groups); Law 9000 Legal Best Practice, SAI GLOBAL, https://www.saiglobal.com/ 
assurance/legal-best-practice/LAW9000.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (exemplifying a certification 
system for legal practices). 
70. See id. at Question 18 (revealing that 40% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that 
“AMS reduced the number of client complaints,” versus only 19% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing 
that client complaints had gone down). 
71. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive 
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
152, 171 (2012) (explaining the regulation in Australia where a designated practitioner must 
complete the SAP). 
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SAF.72  Thirty-three of the 137 responding critics indicated that their 
opinions changed following completion of the SAP.73  This experience 
points to the importance of taking steps to encourage lawyers to examine 
their practices as part of a risk management and practice improvement 
program. 
The steps taken may depend on a variety of factors, including the state’s 
disciplinary procedures, bar programs, and insurer support for risk 
management initiatives.  Progressive regulators, insurers, and bar leaders 
who find data to be persuasive should be more willing to take steps to 
encourage lawyers to engage in self-examination of firm practices and 
systems.  The following discussion considers specific steps that can be 
taken to spur lawyers and firms to systematically examine their practices 
and controls. 
A. Regulatory Mandate Related to Alternative Business Structures 
Outside of Australia, other jurisdictions are now seriously considering 
regulatory reforms, including risk-based approaches to regulation.  
Regulators in a number of Canadian provinces are exploring regulatory 
reforms and studying the experiences in England and Australia.74  For 
example, the Director of Professional Responsibility for the Nova Scotia 
Barristers’ Society recommends that the Council for the Nova Scotia 
Barristers’ Society consider the following changes: 
 
[A]dopting a proactive approach with lawyer and law firms through 
education, engagement, the creation of an appropriate management systems-
based approach, and the provision of tools and training to help firms of all 
sizes practice ethically and competently in the public interest and develop an 
embedded ethical infrastructure . . . [and] allowing firms the room to 
establish appropriate management systems that suit the nature of their 
clientele and to demonstrate their effectiveness, then refocus our attention 
and resources on supporting sole practitioners and small firms in achieving 
appropriate management systems and avoiding problems . . . .75 
 
72. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 
22 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (demonstrating the opinions of respondents 
regarding the required SAP). 
73. See id. at Question 9 (soliciting respondents’ opinions on concerns regarding the SAP). 
74. See THE LAW SOC’Y OF UPPER CANADA, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMITTEE 
REPORT, REPORT TO CONVOCATION, at 432–36 (2013), available at 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147495044 (summarizing different 
approaches used in Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada). 
75. Victoria Rees, Transforming Regulation and Governance in the Public Interest, NOVA SCOTIA 
BARRISTERS’ SOC’Y 51 (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/cms/news/ 
3 FORTNEY_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:06 AM 
2014] Ethics Audits in Improving Management Systems and Practices  127 
 
This excerpt from the report suggests that regulators in other countries 
recognize the value of a proactive “education toward compliance” approach 
that encourages lawyers and their firms to improve their management 
systems.76  As these regulators study the possibility of relaxing prohibitions 
on alternative business structures, management-based principles may be a 
feature of the new regulatory regime.  This is similar to the approach used 
in Australia where the new regulatory approach and SAP evolved out of the 
legislation lifting restrictions on non-lawyer ownership of incorporated 
legal practices.77 
After other jurisdictions join the United Kingdom and Australia in 
allowing non-lawyer ownership of law firms, the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) and state regulators may revisit modifying disciplinary rules that 
prohibit non-lawyer ownership of law firms.78  Any changes in the current 
rules will need to address the critics who argue that non-lawyer ownership 
will undermine core values of the legal profession and public protection.79  
Except for the staunchest critics of changing current prohibitions, the 
reservations of some might be addressed by requiring that safeguards be 
implemented at firms with non-lawyer owners.  These controls could 
include requiring that the firms appoint a general counsel and demonstrate 
that the firm has in place proper management systems to give reasonable 
assurance that firm lawyers act in accordance with their professional 
obligations. 
B. Use of Management-Based Approaches As an Alternative to Discipline 
Given the strong opposition to allowing non-lawyer ownership of law 
firms in the United States, it may be many years until the restrictions on 
 
2013-10-30transformingregulation.pdf. 
76. Id. at 62 (quoting Amy Salyzn, What if We Didn’t Wait? Promoting Ethical Infrastructure in 
Canadian Law Firms, SLAW (Jul. 25 2013) available at http://www.slaw.ca/2013/07/25/what-if-we-
didnt-wait-promoting-ethical-infrastructure-in-canadian-law-firms/). 
77. See id. at 37 (summarizing Australian legal ownership regulations, which allow non-lawyers 
to have co-ownership of law firms). 
78. In 2012, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 considered proposing a limited form of 
non-lawyer ownership in law firms, but decided to remove the idea following strong opposition.  
Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA House Postpone Resolution Reaffirming Opposition to Nonlawyer Ownership 
of Law Firms, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/resolution_confirms_aba_stance_against_nonlawyer_ownership_of_law_firms/. 
79. See id. (describing the votes to close the resolution); see also James D. Moliterno, The 
Trouble with Lawyer Regulation, 62 EMORY L.J. 885, 866–87 (2013) (critiquing the “backward 
looking” and “self-preserving” perspectives of lawyers who oppose non-lawyer ownership of law 
firms). 
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non-lawyer ownership are changed.80  Until that time, there are other 
opportunities for integrating management-based principles into the 
regulation of lawyers.  One avenue that is currently employed in many 
states is to use diversion programs as an alternative to discipline.81  After 
reviewing the genesis of these programs and the approach used in current 
diversion programs, this section discusses the value of broader use of 
diversion programs to deal with minor misconduct and practice 
management concerns. 
Over forty years ago, a Special Committee on Evaluation of 
Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Tom Clark, issued a report analyzing problems related to disciplinary 
enforcement (“the Clark Report”).82  The Clark Report noted that one 
deficiency was that disciplinary procedures failed to address matters 
involving minor misconduct.83 
Twenty years later, the ABA’s Commission on the Evaluation of 
Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by Robert McKay (“the McKay 
Commission”), issued a report that addressed the need for procedures to 
deal with minor misconduct and the need to provide practice management 
guidance to lawyers.84  The McKay Commission recommended the 
establishment of Law Practice Assistance Committees to consider cases 
referred to the committees and to aid lawyers voluntarily seeking 
 
80. James D. Moliterno, The Trouble with Lawyer Regulation, 62 EMORY L.J. 885, 903 (2013)  
(asserting that “lawyer-dominated legislatures” and “professional resistance” will likely stymie 
statutory changes that allow for non-lawyer ownership and Alternative Business Structures). 
81. See ARIZONA ATTORNEY DIVERSION GUIDELINES ADOPTED BY THE ARIZONA SUPREME 
COURT, AZ. BAR (2011), available at http://www.azbar.org/media/66357/diversion%20 
guidelines%20effective%2001-01-11.pdf (outlining the guidelines for the diversion program in 
Arizona); see also Diane M. Ellis, Is Diversion A Viable Alternative to Traditional Discipline?: An 
Analysis of the First Ten Years in Arizona, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 1 (discussing the diversion 
program in Arizona). 
82. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFOREMENT, FINAL DRAFT (1970), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/reports/Clark_Report.authcheckdam. 
pdf. 
83. See id. at 92–95 (examining problems associated with the lack of admonitory procedures to 
deal with minor misconduct).  The Clark Report recommended that disciplinary agencies be 
authorized to issue “informal admonitions in disposing of complaints involving” minor misconduct.  
Id.; see also Diane M. Ellis, Is Diversion A Viable Alternative to Traditional Discipline?: An Analysis of 
the First Ten Years in Arizona, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 1, 4 (discussing the key concerns related to 
the lack of admonitory procedures). 
84. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER 
REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY (1992), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/resources/report_archive/mckay_report.html. 
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assistance.85  The McKay Commission also recommended that 
“jurisdictions should adopt procedures in lieu of discipline for matters in 
which a lawyer’s actions constitute minor misconduct, minor 
incompetence, or minor neglect.”86  As stated in the recommendation, 
disciplinary counsel and the respondent lawyer may agree to submit the 
minor misconduct matter to non-disciplinary proceedings that “may 
consist of fee arbitration, arbitration, mediation, lawyer practice assistance 
. . . or any other non-disciplinary proceedings.”87 
Following the McKay Commission Report, the ABA amended their 
Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement to expressly provide for 
alternatives to discipline.88  Under the amended rules, alternative 
discipline is available for instances of “lesser misconduct.”89  Prior to filing 
 
85. See id. at Recommendation 4 (“The Committee should provide guidance to the lawyer 
including, when appropriate: (a) review of the lawyer’s office and case management practices and 
recommendations for improvement: and (b) review of the lawyer’s substantive knowledge of the law 
and recommendations for further study.”).  Comments to the recommendation noted that the 
Committee could provide direct supervision and guidance or recommend other resources such as 
office management classes or substance abuse counseling.  Id. 
86. Id. at Recommendation 9. 
87. Id.; see also id. at Recommendation 10 (setting forth expedited procedures for handling 
instances of minor misconduct); Diane M. Ellis, Is Diversion A Viable Alternative to Traditional 
Discipline?: An Analysis of the First Ten Years in Arizona, PROF. LAW., Fall 2002, at 1, 4 (explaining 
that the ABA adopted the McKay Commission recommendations in 1992). 
88.  Joseph Roszkowski, Hot ABA Annual Meeting Subjects, R.I. B.J., Nov. 1996, at 13, 15 
(noting that in 1996, the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolution adding the alternatives to 
discipline provisions to Rule 11 of the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement).  “The 
Philadelphia Bar Association and the ABA standing Committees on Professional Discipline, Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility and Lawyers’ Responsibility for Client Protection” sponsored the 
amendment.  Conference Draws Record Attendance, PROF. LAW, Aug. 1996, at 20, 24 (reporting on an 
ABA National Conference on Professional Responsibility panel that discussed how alternatives to 
discipline best address causes of lawyer incompetence). 
89. Rule 9(2) under the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement states that 
“[l]esser misconduct is conduct that does not warrant a sanction restricting the respondent’s license to 
practice law.”  MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 9(2) (2002), available 
at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lawyer_ethics_regulation/
model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enforcement.html.  The rule states that conduct shall not be 
viewed as lesser misconduct if:  
(1) the misconduct involves the misappropriation of funds; 
(2) the misconduct results in or is likely to result in substantial prejudice to a client or 
other person; 
(3) the respondent has been publically disciplined in the last three years; 
(4) the misconduct is of the same nature as misconduct for which the respondent has been 
disciplined in the last five years; 
(5) the misconduct involves dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation by the 
respondent; 
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formal charges, Model Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement R.11 empowers 
disciplinary counsel to refer matters involving lesser misconduct to the 
Alternatives to Discipline Program.90  As provided in the rule, alternatives 
to discipline may include “fee arbitration, arbitration, mediation, law office 
management assistance, lawyer assistance programs, psychological 
counseling, continuing legal education programs, ethics school or any 
other program authorized by the court.”91  The rule sets forth factors for 
determining if a referral is appropriate.92  It also describes the mechanics 
for handling the referral, including notice to complainant and 
documentation of the terms of the referral in an agreement between the 
respondent lawyer and disciplinary counsel.93  Once a respondent lawyer 
completes the terms of the agreement with disciplinary counsel, the matter 
is effectively dismissed.94  On the other hand, the matter may proceed 
through the normal disciplinary channels when respondents decline to 
participate in the diversion program or fail to fulfill the agreement.95 
A number of states have amended their disciplinary procedures to 
provide for alternatives to discipline, including diversion programs.96  In 
these programs, complaints accusing lawyers of minor misconduct are 
diverted from the disciplinary process to a program where the lawyers may 
 
(6) the misconduct constitutes a “serious crime” as defined in [the Rules]; 
(7) the misconduct is part of a pattern of similar misconduct.  
Id. 
90. Id. R. 11(7). 
91. Id.  
92. Id.  The pertinent factors deciding whether to refer a respondent are:  
(a) whether the presumptive sanction under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions for the violations listed in the complaint is likely to be no more severe than 
reprimand or admonition; 
(b) whether participation in the program is likely to benefit the respondent and 
accomplish the goals set forth by the program; 
(c) whether aggravating or mitigating factors exist; and 
(d) whether diversion was already tried.  
Id. R. 11(7)(3). 
93. Id. R. 11(2). 
94. See id. R. 11(7)(6) (“[D]isciplinary complaint shall be held in abeyance [dismissed] pending 
successful completion of the terms of the contract.”). 
95. See id. R. 11(7)(7)(b) (“A material breach of the contract shall be cause for termination of 
the respondent’s participation in the program . . . [and] disciplinary proceedings may be resumed or 
reinstituted.”). 
96. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative 
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 264 (2012) (describing how jurisdictions used different 
methods to resolve less serious complaints). 
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obtain guidance, education, and monitoring.97  Some form of diversion 
program currently exists in twenty-four states, plus the District of 
Columbia.98  Although a jurisdiction may narrow the eligibility for a 
diversion program to lawyers suffering from some impairment, the vast 
majority of the jurisdictions allow participation by lawyers suffering from 
impairment or struggling with practice management problems.99 
A survey of rules for diversion programs reveals that many share 
common features.100  As a starting point, the rules clarify the eligibility for 
participation in the program.  Some states use the term “minor 
misconduct” to refer to the general category of matters that may be 
diverted.101  Other states describe with more specificity the types of 
misconduct that may result in diversion.102 
 
97. See, e.g., Susie Morgan, When Bad Things Happen to Basically Good Lawyers: LSBA Program 
Offers “Alternative to Discipline” Assistance, 46 LA. B. J. 388, 388 (1999) (describing the features of the 
Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA) program).  In Louisiana, the Practice Assistance and 
Improvement Program has two components: the Diversionary Program and the Attorney/Client 
Assistance Program.  The Diversionary Program handles matters after disciplinary counsel has found 
misconduct and made a referral to the program.  If disciplinary counsel screens a complaint and 
determines that only minor misconduct has been alleged, but that it does not merit a full 
investigation, disciplinary counsel may refer the matter to the Attorney/Client Assistance Program, 
where practice assistance counsel will attempt to facilitate a resolution between the complainant and 
the respondent.  Id. at 389–90. 
98. According to an internet search conducted by my research assistant in November 2013, 
programs exist in the following states:  Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming.  Cf. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1, 4 n.19 (2007) (identifying twenty-two jurisdictions with diversion programs). 
99. In New York, three of the four Appellate Divisions have adopted rules allowing for 
diversion for lawyers suffering from substance abuse or other dependency; “[t]he Bellacosa 
Commission recommended the adoption of a uniform rule by all four departments” in New York. 
Compare NY State Lawyers Assistance Programs, Diversion Model Rules: Diversion-to-Monitoring rule, 
NYLAT, http://www.nylat.org/projects/diversionrules/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) 
(outlining the recommended rules to the four departments), with NY State Lawyers Assistance 
Programs, Diversion Model Rules: Comparison Matrix of Diversion Rules, NYLAT, 
http://www.nylat.org/projects/diversionrules/comparison.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) 
(displaying a comparison chart of the recommended rules and how they have been enacted). 
100. The headings in the Missouri diversion rule provide a good overview of the matters 
commonly covered in diversion rules: the Offer of Diversion, Diversion Program (describing available 
services), Participation in the Program, Diversion Agreement, Costs of Diversion, Effect of Diversion, 
Effect of Successful Completion of the Diversion Agreement, Breach of Diversion Agreement, Effect 
of Rejection of Recommendation for Diversion, and Confidentiality.  MO. SUPREME CT. R. 5.105 
(2003), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHandbooksP2RulesOnly.nsf/0/ 
4db1af73e9e6731386256ca6005216df?OpenDocument. 
101. FLA. B. REG. R. 3–5.3 (2004), available at https://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/ 
FV/A5AD0ADA6E7E8BB285256EA7005EB692 (“Disciplinary cases that otherwise would be 
disposed of by a finding of minor misconduct or by a finding of no probable cause with a letter of 
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In reviewing a complaint, disciplinary counsel or a disciplinary panel 
may offer the respondent the opportunity to enter the diversion program if 
they determine that the matter is one that is eligible for diversion.103  
Under state rules, the voluntary nature of participation by the respondent 
is a key feature of the diversion program.104  The disciplinary counsel and 
respondent may enter a diversion agreement or contract that specifically 
sets forth the terms and conditions of the participation.105  The rules 
describe the effect of a respondent successfully complying with terms of the 
agreement, as well as the consequences for breaching the agreement.106  
Rules vary in the manner in which they deal with costs associated with 
participating in the program and the confidentiality of participation in the 
program.107 
Although state rules vary in the manner in which they approach 
diversion, all provide an “intervention” opportunity for lawyers to obtain 
assistance and deal with issues that may lead to problems in the future.108  
 
advice are eligible for diversion to practice and professionalism enhancement programs.”). 
102. See AZ. BAR, ARIZONA ATTORNEY DIVERSION GUIDELINES ADOPTED BY THE ARIZONA 
SUPREME COURT, at 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.azbar.org/media/66357/diversion%20 
guidelines%20effective%2001-01-11.pdf (describing cases eligible for diversion, as well as cases not 
eligible for diversion). 
103. See, e.g., WASH. CT. R. 6.1 (2014), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/ 
?fa=court_rules.display&group=ga&set=ELC&ruleid=gaelc0606.01 (noting that “disciplinary counsel 
may refer a respondent lawyer to” the diversion program).  In some states, a disciplinary committee 
or panel can later recommend that a matter be diverted.  See N.J. R. GOVERNING THE CTS., 1:20–3 
(2013), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/r1-20.htm (authorizing a disciplinary 
committee chair to request that the Director of the Office of Attorney Ethics divert a matter and 
approve an agreement in lieu of disciplinary action). 
104. See UTAH JUD. COUNCIL RULES OF JUD. ADMIN. R. 14–533 (2013), available at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/ch14/05%20Lawyer%20Discipline/USB14-533.html 
(explaining how a respondent may be referred to diversion program). 
105. The Utah rule requires that the diversion contract “be supported by the respondent’s or 
the respondent’s lawyer’s affidavit or declaration” setting forth the purpose for diversion and how the 
specific terms of the diversion contract will address the allegation raised by the complaint.  Id. 
106. See KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203 (d)(2)(vi–vii) (2010), available at  http://www.kscourts.org 
/rules/rule-list.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attorneys (stating that “formal disciplinary 
procedures will resume” if the respondent fails to complete the diversion program). 
107. Many state rules require the respondent to pay for the diversion program.  See, e.g., WIS. 
SUP. CT. R. 22.10 (5) (2013), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rule/chap22.pdf (“[T]he 
attorney shall pay all costs incurred in connection with participation in an alternatives to discipline 
program.”); see also id. R. 22.10(8) (noting that all files and records of diversion are confidential). 
108. Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to Disciplinary 
Authorities: Filling the Reporting Gap, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 442–43 (2012).  Greenbaum explains:  
If the system could better identify patterns of behavior that warrant intervention before 
serious misconduct occurs, and offer remedial training to help solve incipient problems, 
that would significantly benefit  lawyers, clients and the profession.  To the extent that the 
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Rather than having to deal with misconduct after it occurs, participation in 
a diversion program advances public protection by preventing 
problems.109 
By entering into an individualized diversion agreement, lawyers obtain 
guidance, support, and tools to meet their particular needs.110  Because 
participation is voluntary, lawyers are likely to be open to 
recommendations on how to improve their practices.111 
Long-term diversion saves time and money if the remedial training 
helps lawyers avoid future misconduct and complaints.112  Even in the 
short term, diversion may cost less than processing a complaint through 
the formal disciplinary process.113 
Both disciplinary counsel and respondent counsel have commented on 
the value of diversion program in protecting the public by helping lawyers 
change how they practice.114  Bar journal articles have discussed the value 
of diversion programs as an alternative to discipline.115 
 
present contraction of the legal market has forced more new lawyers to enter solo practice 
without expertise or mentors, the need for remedial training will grow.  
Id. 
109. See Mark A. Armitage, Regulating Competence, 52 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1107 (2003) (urging 
“courts, discipline agencies, bar associations, and the academy [to] dedicate the time and resources to 
refine, enhance, and propagate programs aimed at protecting the public from [disciplinary violations] 
in the first place”).  Mark A. Armitage served as Associate Director of the Attorney Discipline Board 
of Michigan.  Id. at 1103 n.*. 
110. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative 
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 271 (2012) (“An enormous benefit of such programs is that the 
diversion contract can be specifically tailored to the respondent’s shortcomings to help prevent similar 
violation in the future.”). 
111. See id. (suggesting that respondents are more “likely to be agreeable and open to 
recommendations on how to improve” their practices because they must consent to the diversion 
agreement). 
112. See id. at 273 (“Diversion programs using mediation do facilitate communication between 
the respondent and the complainant, and the mediation may lead to a resolution more quickly than 
formal disciplinary proceedings.”). 
113. See id. at 271 (“Diversion programs are often cheaper and faster than formal grievance 
hearings.”). 
114. See, e.g., Linda Acevedo, Grievance Referral Program, How the Texas Disciplinary Counsel’s 
Office Is Helping Lawyers Help Themselves, TEX. B. J., June 2013, at 521, 521 (noting that in six years, 
the Texas diversion program has “become an integral part of the Texas attorney discipline system” 
with more than 230 attorneys completing the program and thirty participating in the program at the 
time the article was written).  Mark Harrison, an experienced respondent counsel, noted that 70% of 
informal charges could be diverted, rather than formally prosecuted.  Diane M. Ellis, A Decade of 
Diversion: Empirical Evidence that Alternative Discipline Is Working for Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY 
L.J., 1221, 1230 (2003). 
115. See Linda Acevedo, Grievance Referral Program, How the Texas Disciplinary Counsel’s Office 
Is Helping Lawyers Help Themselves, TEX. B.J., June 2013, at 521, 521–22 (outlining the benefits of 
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One empirical study reported on the impact of the Arizona alternative 
discipline system.116  Using data from a ten-year period, the researchers 
analyzed the frequency and severity of disciplinary charges filed against 
lawyers after they successfully completed the diversion program.117  To 
objectively measure the effectiveness of the diversion program, the study 
compared the frequency and severity of disciplinary “charges filed against 
lawyers who successfully completed a diversion program, as compared to” 
the charges against lawyers who declined to participate in a diversion 
program.118  Based on the analysis of the data, the study report concluded 
that there was “a statistically significant difference in the number and 
severity of subsequent disciplinary charges between lawyers who [had] 
completed a . . . diversion program and those who [had] not.”119 
Although these findings can be used by proponents who advocate wider 
use of diversion programs, the study relied only on available records.120  
This data set may not have reflected the actual number of attorneys who 
were diverted and had their records expunged because they had not been 
subject to new complaints for a three-year period following their 
completion of a diversion program.121 
 
the Texas diversion program); Lawyers Helping Lawyers: LSBA Program Offers Alternatives to 
Discipline, LA. B. J., June 2001, at 50, 50 (“[T]he Louisiana State Bar Association’s (LSBA) Practice 
Assistance and Improvement Program is a resounding success.”). 
116. See Diane M. Ellis, A Decade of Diversion: Empirical Evidence That Alternative Discipline is 
Working for Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY L.J., 1221, 1222 (2003) (stating that the study’s purpose 
was “to evaluate the impact diversion has had on Arizona’s lawyer regulatory system”).  Diane M. 
Ellis, the Director of the State Bar of Arizona Law Office Management Assistance Program, and 
member Assistance Program also noted that the information from the study helped State Bar 
executives evaluate decisions about programs and resources, while giving Lawyer Assistance personnel 
concrete data to use in designing diversion programs.  Id.  Ms. Ellis also suggested that the study 
would help lawyers evaluate whether they should participate in a diversion program and proactively 
seek management assistance.  Id. 
117. See id.at 1221 (analyzing “data from the time the State Bar of Arizona’s Law Office 
Management Assistance Program (LOMAP) was established in April 1992 to April 2002”). 
118. Id. at 1252. 
119. Id. at 1255.  Another finding was that neither “the breadth of [the] assessment [n]or the 
length of . . . participation” by the lawyer appears to be critical, but extensiveness of the terms of the 
agreement “appear[ed] to have a much clearer link with desirable results.”  Id. at 1265. 
120. Id. 
121. In an insightful article examining public access to information on lawyer discipline, 
Professor Leslie Levin pointed to this limitation in the Arizona diversion study.  See Leslie C. Levin, 
The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5 (2007) (cautioning that 
“little is known about how well diversion programs work generally or how well individual diversion 
options work”).  In pointing out limitations in the study, Professor Levin also noted that “the 
‘control group’ against which recidivism rates were compared included lawyers who did not qualify 
for diversion because their offenses were too serious.”  Id. at 5 n.26.  She also explained that “the 
study did not account for the how the absence” or existence of prior discipline or the lack thereof 
3 FORTNEY_GERMANO_FINAL_CLEAN 6/24/2014  11:06 AM 
2014] Ethics Audits in Improving Management Systems and Practices  135 
In order to better assess recidivism by lawyers who complete a diversion 
program, administrators of these programs should maintain records for a 
longer period of time, or at least maintain them for statistical purposes.122  
Such statistical information provides a more complete picture for research, 
and helps us understand the extent to which diversion experiences impact 
the manner in which lawyers practice and discharge their responsibilities. 
As disciplinary authorities evaluate their current diversion programs or 
consider establishing new diversion programs, they can take steps to 
address other public protection issues related to diversion.  One such 
concern relates to whether diversion programs improperly shield lawyers by 
allowing them to escape formal discipline and a record that would later be 
an aggravating factor if the lawyer is faced with disciplinary charges.123  
To deal with this criticism, diversion rules can provide that records related 
to diversion agreements “remain confidential and not available to the 
public . . . [but that] the information may be considered in any future 
disciplinary matters” evaluated by disciplinary authorities.124 
Another consumer concern relates to the treatment of persons whose 
filed complaints are referred to diversion programs.  In discussing the 
virtues of restorative justice, one commentator explained that diversion 
programs’ emphasis on the rehabilitation and the future may ignore the 
 
affected the disciplinary counsel’s evaluation of subsequent complaints.  See id. (noting the relevance 
because expunging the records may contribute to disciplinary counsel assuming that the respondent 
lawyer had a “clean” record).  If lawyers with expunged records receive leniency because disciplinary 
counsel believe that the lawyers had not previously engaged in questionable conduct, this could skew 
the numbers related to the impact of diversion is preventing future misconduct.  Id. 
122. To monitor the recidivism rate of lawyers who successfully complete diversion, Kansas 
maintains annual statistical records of the number of complaints assigned to the Attorney Diversion 
Program.  See KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203(d)(3)(i) (2010), available at http://www.kscourts.org/rules/rule-
list.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attorneys (specifying that the information should 
include “the final disposition[], the number of diversion agreements reached, the number of 
complaints returned to the traditional disciplinary process, and the success or failure of [r]espondents 
in completing their diversion” programs). 
123. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative 
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 271 (2012) (warning that the public may not learn about some 
repeat offenders who game diversion programs to their advantage). 
124. Kansas uses such an approach, noting that successful completion of a diversion program is 
“reported back to the Review Committee” and will result in the dismissal of the complaint, but in 
future disciplinary matter the Disciplinary Administrator may consider the information as “prior 
discipline.”  KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203(d)(2)(vi) (2010), available at  http://www.kscourts.org/rules/rule-
list.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attorneys.  In Iowa, upon successful completion of a 
diversion program, the board dismisses the complaint, the attorney shall not be considered 
“disciplined, but the attorney’s admission of misconduct may be considered in imposing sanctions” if 
the attorney is later disciplined.  R. P. IOWA SUP. CT. ATT’Y DISCIPLINARY BOARD 34.13(5) (2005). 
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past and complainants’ desire to tell their stories.125  Failure to provide 
complainants with information on diversion can heighten their frustration 
and disappointment first with their treatment by their lawyers, and then 
their treatment in the disciplinary system.126  To avoid this risk, some 
diversion rules require that complainants be provided notice of the 
diversion decision and an opportunity to comment.127 
States that do not have diversion programs should seriously consider 
adopting rules that allow for diversion for practice management concerns.  
New rules and programs can be designed to address the criticism of aspects 
of current approaches.  For example, the disciplinary procedure rules can 
provide for more communication with complainants so that they better 
appreciate the value of diversion in preventing future misconduct.128  
More communication on the alternatives to discipline can also help shape 
perspectives so that lawyers better understand the educational role of 
disciplinary authorities.129 
For new diversion programs, as well as existing ones, audits or self-
assessments can play an important role in helping lawyers systematically 
evaluate how they can improve and manage their law practices.  As 
indicated by the research on the new regulatory regime in Australia, there 
was a significant reduction in complaints for firms that completed the 
SAP.130  My own research revealed that the majority of respondents took 
 
125. Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative 
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 271 (2012) (pointing out that the diversion process leaves out 
the complainant and other stakeholders). 
126. See id. (stating that because the specific dispute that led to the complaint might never be 
resolved, diversion is likely to increase “public dissatisfaction with the legal profession”). 
127. For example, the Wyoming Rule states:  
The complainant, if any, shall be notified of the proposed decision to refer the respondent 
to diversion.  The complainant shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of notice to 
submit to Bar Counsel a written comment thereon.  The complainant also shall be 
notified when a complaint or formal charge is diverted.  Decisions to divert are not 
appealable.  
DISCIPLINARY CODE WYO. ST. B. (14)(c) (2012), available at, http://www.courts.state.wy.us/ 
CourtRules_Entities.aspx?RulesPage=DisciplinaryCode.xml. 
128. See Norman E. Veasey, Transcript from Professionalism Conference, 54 S.C. L. REV. 897, 
930 (2003) (suggesting that alternatives to discipline should be communicated more among state bar 
members). 
129. See id. (urging more publicity of the alternatives to discipline in which the bar and 
disciplinary authorities provide education and support). 
130. See Victoria Rees, Transforming Regulation and Governance in the Public Interest, NOVA 
SCOTIA BARRISTERS’ SOC’Y (Oct. 15, 2013), available at http://nsbs.org/sites/default/files/ 
cms/news/2013-10-30transformingregulation.pdf (discussing Australia’s approach to reducing 
complaints brought against attorneys). 
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steps to revise their policies, procedures, and systems following self-
assessment and close to fifty percent adopted new policies, procedures, and 
systems.131  These results should help directors of diversion programs 
recognize the value of conducting ethics audits and developing self-
assessment tools. 
Diversion programs enable lawyers to keep their records clean by taking 
steps to evaluate and improve their practice management.  For those 
lawyers, disciplinary complaints serve as a wake-up call, motivating them 
to examine how they practice and handle client business.132  Lawyers who 
are not facing grievances should be able to obtain guidance and resources 
from personnel with diversion and law practice management programs.133  
In an effort to be proactive in educating lawyers and avoiding complaints, 
bar associations should devote more resources to offices and programs that 
assist lawyers with law practice management.  Bar groups could follow the 
lead of the Canadian Bar Association in developing an online tool for 
lawyers to voluntarily examine their practices and systems.134  Rather than 
relying on voluntary self-assessment, progressive jurists who embrace the 
concept of proactive regulation might establish a NSW-style program as a 
complement to discipline.135 
 
131. See Susan Saab Fortney, Am I My Partner’s Keeper? Peer Review in Law Firms, 66 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 329, 363 (1995) (describing the self-assessment model authorized by the ALI-ABA to 
be used by practitioners). 
132. See KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203(d)(1)(i) (2010), available at http://www.kscourts.org/rules/rule-
list.asp?r1=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attorneys (portraying how a diversion rule could allow 
a respondent to request that a complaint be referred to diversion). 
133. As explained by Professor Ted Schneyer, Law Office Management Programs generally 
serve two functions: (1) a reactive one of handling a matter referred by disciplinary counsel, and (2) a 
proactive one in “advising lawyers who voluntarily seek their assistance on matters such as” office 
management.  Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive Management Based Regulation to Improve 
Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 263–64 (2013). 
134. CBA Ethical Practice Self-Evaluation Tool, THE CAN. BAR. ASS’N., available at 
http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/ethicalselfevaluation-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).  The 
online tool sets forth ten objectives under the following general categories: (1) Relationship to 
Clients; (2) Relationship to Students, Employees, and Others; and (3) Relationship to Regulator, 
Third Parties, and the Public Generally.  Id.  The introduction to the tool explains that the 
Professional Responsibility Committee prepared the “Ethical Practices Self-Evaluation Tool to assist 
Canadian law firms and lawyers to systematically examine the ethical infrastructure that supports 
their legal practices . . . [t]he goal of the Self-Evaluation Tool is not to be prescriptive but rather to 
encourage exploration and discussion of firm practices.”  Id.  For each objective, the tool outlines 
“possible questions to ask in assessing compliance with” the objective and “potential systems and 
practices to ensure that the objective is met.”  Id.  In addition, the tool links available online resources 
that lawyers may consult for additional guidance.  Id. 
135. See Ted Schneyer, The Case for Proactive Management Based Regulation to Improve 
Professional Self-Regulation for U.S. Lawyers, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 264 (2013) (suggesting that 
courts establish proactive NSW-style programs as a complement to reactive discipline).  Professor 
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Short of imposing some type of self-assessment, courts, legislators, 
regulators, bar leaders, and insurers should take other steps to create 
incentives for lawyers to devote time and resources to serious examination 
of their practices.  The following section discusses the role of insurance 
carriers in encouraging lawyers to examine and improve their management 
controls and systems. 
C. Insurers’ Role in Promoting Self-Assessment and Development of Systems 
For decades, legal malpractice insurers have played an important role in 
encouraging ethical conduct by lawyers.136  Some commentators have 
examined the impact of insurers, examining how insurers have emerged as 
informal regulators of lawyer conduct.137  When it comes to risk 
management, the insurers’ influence takes different forms. 
Insurers’ influence on the conduct of lawyers starts with the application 
for insurance that lawyers must complete to obtain insurance.138  The 
policy application asks a number of questions, seeking information to 
enable the insurer to evaluate whether the insurer will assume the risk of 
writing a policy, and if so, the price and terms of the coverage.139  In 
addition to asking general information about the prospective insured, 
policy applications request information relating to firm practices, policies, 
and systems.  Common questions require applicants to describe their 
conflict of interest and docket control systems.140  Insurance underwriters 
 
Schneyer further claims that a NSW-style program could be expected to cut down substantially on 
complaints for unprofessional conduct by “encouraging and helping firms to adhere to policies, 
procedures, and systems designed to forestall acts and omissions that generate those complaints.”  Id. 
136. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 224 (1996) (suggesting that insurers have had an impact on attorney ethical 
conduct for years). 
137. Compare id. at 216 (arguing that insurance companies seek to “discourage, i.e., to regulate, 
conduct which the ethics codes and the ethics committees” deem to be risky by providing “express 
notice to insureds that they are on their own when it comes to liability for claims arising from such 
relationships”), with Charles Silver, Professional Liability Insurance As Insurance and As Lawyer 
Regulation: Response to Davis, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 234 (1996) (“I find Davis’s proposed 
explanation unpersuasive.  Insurers do not usually cite a desire to discourage risky conduct when 
justifying exclusions.  They argue for exclusions on straightforward grounds having to do with their 
own interests.”). 
138. Fritz K. Huszagh, Applying for Legal Malpractice Insurance, in LEGAL MALPRACTICE:  
LAW OFFICE GUIDE TO PURCHASING LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, § 6:2 (Ronald E. Mallen 
ed., 2012). 
139. See id. (explaining that insurers use the information disclosed on the application to 
evaluate risk exposure based on underwriting guidelines, rules, and practices). 
140. See id. § 6:2, § 6:14 (suggesting that most insurance applications require information 
regarding how a firm controls its calendar system and screens for conflicts or interests). 
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seek this information because they recognize that the “better the 
procedures, the more acceptable the risk.”141  These application questions 
require that lawyers examine their firms’ management systems and describe 
them on policy applications.142 
As a condition of obtaining insurance or a lower premium, an insurer 
may require that applicant-firms complete an audit or practice review.  
Such a review will help the firm determine issues to be addressed and 
inform the insurer’s underwriting decisions.143 
Once insured, carriers assist insured firms with risk management.144  
For example, the Attorneys’ Liability Assurance Society (Bermuda) Ltd. 
(ALAS Ltd.), a mutual insurance company owned entirely by its insured 
member firms, claims to have the most comprehensive loss-prevention 
program for lawyers.145  Through the program, member firms can obtain 
educational material and a range of services, including consultations with 
loss prevention counsel.146 
Depending on the circumstances, an insurer may provide a premium 
discount for particular conduct that the insurer wants to encourage.  For 
example, an insurer may provide a premium credit for lawyers completing 
particular training or continuing legal education programs.147  Using a 
similar approach to promoting conduct that educates lawyers and lowers 
liability risk, insurers should provide a premium discount for lawyers who 
systematically examine their firm policies, procedures, and systems.  As 
indicated by the first Australian study, a self-examination process can help 
address issues that lead to complaints.148  My own study revealed that the 
 
141. See id. § 6:14 (“Today, a law firm without a conflict of interest screening system and a 
calendaring system is not likely to be an acceptable risk.”). 
142. See id. (“Most applications request information regarding the ‘housekeeping’ maintained 
by the applicant.”). 
143. If a firm’s insurance needs are complex or unique, Jody A. Harris, Senior Vice President 
and Managing Director of Gallagher Lawyer Professional Risk Services, recommends that the 
applicant meet with the underwriting agency.  She suggests that during the meeting, the attorney 
emphasize the proactive steps the firm takes to avoid claims.  Jody A. Harris, Purchasing Lawyers 
Professional Liability Insurance through an Independent Broker Specialist, in LEGAL MALPRACTICE:  
LAW OFFICE GUIDE TO PURCHASING LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE, § 4, § 4:7 (Ronald E. 
Mallen ed., 2012). 
144. See id. § 7:3 (referring to great variance between insurers and the free services that they 
offer). 
145. Loss Prevention, ATT’YS LIABILITY ASSURANCE SOC’Y, INC., http://www.alas.com/public/ 
about_lp.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
146. Id. 
147. See id. (noting that insurers often provide special workshops and seminars regarding loss 
prevention). 
148. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive 
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self-assessment process contributed to 71% of firms revising their systems, 
policies, and controls and 47% adopting new systems, policies, and 
procedures.149  A large percentage (42%) indicated that they strengthened 
firm management following the SAP.150  These study results should 
persuade insurers to take steps to encourage lawyers to examine their firms’ 
policies, practices, and systems as the first step in fortifying the firms’ 
ethical infrastructure.  As noted by a veteran loss-prevention expert, 
insurers already understand data.151  Therefore, insurers should take note 
of research findings related to the value of self-assessments.  These studies 
provide support for insurers providing premium discounts for lawyers who 
systematically examine firm policies, procedures, controls, and systems. 
To assist firms in examining their practices, insurers could also develop 
SAFs designed for firms of varying sizes.152  An online self-assessment tool 
could then link other materials, such as forms, articles, and guidelines that 
could assist lawyers in developing and revising their own policies, 
procedures, and guidance.153  Developing an effective self-assessment tool 
with supporting material involves a great investment of time and 
resources.154  Some insurers, such as companies that are members of the 
National Bar Related Insurance Companies, could join forces and 
 
and Thrive: A Study of the Australian Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 ST. THOMAS L.J. 
152, 160–62 (2012) (determining the best way to implement a self-examination process). 
149. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 
12 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (showing that 42% of firms “[s]trengthened firm 
management [upon] completion of the Self Assessment Process”). 
150. Id. 
151. Interview with Robert Creamer, former loss prevention counsel with ALAS, in 
Charleston, S.C. (Nov. 14, 2013) (expressing the view that insurers regularly make decisions based 
on data). 
152. SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 22 
(2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (revealing that many respondents from small firms 
believed that the self-assessment instrument should be revised for more applicability to small and solo 
practices). 
153. See CBA Ethical Practice Self-Evaluation Tool, THE CAN. BAR ASS’N., available at 
http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/ethicalselfevaluation-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) 
(providing an example of an online assessment tool with links to resources); see also TLIE Self-Audit 
Conflict of Interest Checklist, TEX. LAW. INS. EXCH., available at http://tlie.org/prevention/self-audit-
conflicts.php (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (providing a printed self-audit booklet of which portions 
are published online). 
154. See generally ANTHONY E. DAVIS & PETER R. JARVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SURVIVAL 
TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS (2d ed. 2007) (providing an example of two legal malpractice experts who 
have devoted countless hours to developing checklists included in a risk management book for 
lawyers). 
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collaborate on developing both self-assessment tools and related 
educational material.155 
Insurers who currently provide audit services or self-assessment tools may 
have encountered some resistance from lawyers who expressed concern 
about the discovery of the results.156  To address this concern, interested 
parties should support the recognition of a self-evaluation privilege, 
discussed in the next section. 
D. The Role of Privileges  
Results from my empirical study on law firm peer review reflected the 
concern that lawyers may be reluctant to engage in an SAP if they believe 
that the information developed in the process could later be discoverable 
and used against them in a legal malpractice case.157  The survey 
instrument asked respondents to register their opinions relating to 
willingness to conduct peer review and perspectives on risks associated with 
third parties obtaining peer review results.158  In the survey of managing 
partners of Texas firms with ten or more lawyers, “7% [of the respondents 
indicated that their firms did] not engage in formal peer review because the 
results might be discoverable.”159  “[Thirty-six percent of the respondents 
reported that] their firms would be more likely to institute peer review 
measures if peer review communications were protected from 
discovery.”160  A large percentage of respondents (86%) concurred that 
“peer review should be afforded confidentiality so that third parties cannot 
discover the results of peer review.”161  Analyzed together, these results 
suggest that the risk of discoverability may deter some lawyers and their 
 
155. See THE NAT’L ASS’N OF BAR RELATED INS. COMPANIES, http://www.nabrico.org (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2014) (listing contact information and website links to member firms). 
156. Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study of 
Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 297 (1996). 
157. See SUSAN FORTNEY, INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICE SURVEY, RESULTS, at Question 
12 (2012) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (indicating that approximately 84% of 
respondents claimed to review their policies and procedures after completing the SAP); see also Susan 
Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer 
Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 296–97 (1996) (explaining the results of the 
empirical study related to law firm peer review). 
158. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical 
Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 274 (1996) (explaining 
the various benefits of peer review). 
159. Id. at 297. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
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firms from conducting formal self-assessments, especially ones with 
documentation. 
To provide protection for material and information developed in a 
practice review, firms or their insurers may retain the services of an outside 
lawyer to audit the practice and provide an opinion letter on findings and 
possible steps to improve their policies, procedures, and systems.162  
Assuming that the opinion letter and related reports qualify as 
communications to facilitate the rendition of legal services, the firm could 
assert that the attorney-client privilege shields communications between 
the outside attorney and the client—the law firm. 
A firm might use a different tack, relying on the firm’s in-house general 
counsel or ethics advisor to conduct the self-assessment.  The ability of a 
firm to successfully rely on attorney-client privilege to protect any report or 
material developed by the in-house counsel turns on various factors, 
including whether the self-assessment would be treated as an internal 
investigation that created a conflict between the interests of the firm and 
current client.163  For many years, courts rejected firms’ claims that the 
attorney-client privilege protected such in-firm communications.164  
Although recent court opinions have been more willing to extend 
protection to in-firm communications, the law is in flux.165  Even if 
courts extend protection to internal investigations conducted by in-house 
counsel (to facilitate the rendition of legal services), courts could reject a 
 
162. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.5 (2013 ed.) 
(noting that “the use of outside counsel can provide protection of the attorney-client privilege, which 
may not be available [if] inside counsel” at the firm handles risk management matters). 
163. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical 
Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 297–300 (1996) 
(discussing the factors that early court opinions focused on when deciding whether an application of 
privilege created a conflict with current firm clients). 
164. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1721, 1725–27 (2005) (critiquing the early opinions and proposal for recognizing a privilege); see also 
St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, PC, 746 S.E.2d 98, 108–09 (Ga. 
2013) (adopting a fact-specific rule when determining whether in-firm counsel privilege exists if the 
firm takes certain steps derived from Professor Chambliss’s article); Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law 
Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 297–300 (1996) (tracing the early developments related to in-firm 
privilege); ABA Formally Backs Attorney-Client Privilege for Consults with Law Firms’ Inside Counsel, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 28, 2013), available at http://www.bna.com/aba-formally-backs-
n17179876446/ (providing the revised text of the August 12, 2013 ABA House of Delegates adopted 
resolution, which urged the legislature and the courts to recognize the privilege for communications 
between lawyers and in-firm counsel). 
165. ANTHONY E. DAVIS, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE WITHIN FIRMS AND LAW 
DEPARTMENTS, N.Y. L.J., 2 (2013) (examining “cases that have significantly expanded the ability of” 
firms to rely on a privilege between firm lawyers and the designated firm general counsel). 
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claim that the attorney-client privilege extends to routine self-examinations 
or audits of firm practices, procedures, and systems. 
Rather than relying on attorney-client privilege, a firm might claim that 
a self-critical analysis privilege shields information developed in a firm 
audit or SAP.  A few U.S. courts have “recognized a privilege from 
discovery in litigation for some information produced as a result of an 
organization’s own internal evaluation of its operation.”166  The policy 
justification for extending protection to information developed in internal 
investigations is to encourage firms to critically examine their practices, 
without fear that negative information would later be used against them in 
litigation.167  Courts have applied the privilege in different contexts, 
including cases involving medical peer review, securities violations, train 
cases, and some employment discrimination cases.168  Opinions that have 
applied the self-evaluation privilege have identified the following 
prerequisites: 
 
1. The critical self-analysis must have been undertaken by the parties 
seeking protection; 
2. The public must possess a strong interest in preserving the free flow 
of the type of information sought; 
3. The information must be of the type that its free flow would be 
curtailed if discovery were allowed; and 
4. Any document produced must have been prepared with the 




166. Stephen P. Pepe et al., Audit: Assessing Current Policies and Procedures Under Applicable 
Laws and Regulations, in CORP. COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE FAIR HIRING 
AND TERMINATION PROGRAM 3:14 (2010–2011 ed. 2010) (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 
50 F.R.D. 249, 14 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 759 (D. D.C. 1970), aff’d, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).  
Bredice was the first case in which the court applied a qualified privilege to protect a medical staff 
committee’s internal communications.  See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto 
Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
271, 301–02 (1996) (commenting on the Brendice opinion). 
167. Stephen P. Pepe et al., Audit: Assessing Current Policies and Procedures Under Applicable 
Laws and Regulations, in CORP. COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE FAIR HIRING 
AND TERMINATION PROGRAM 3:14 (2010–2011 ed. 2010) (suggesting that candid, self-critical 
evaluation improves organizations’ compliance with legal requirements). 
168. 9A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 4670.15 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2008). 
169. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? An Empirical 
Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 301–02 (1996) 
(explaining the origin of all four factors); see also Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 
426 (9th Cir. 1992) (articulating the fourth factor); Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983) (identifying the first three factors). 
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A firm that conducts an internal review should be able to satisfy each of 
these prerequisites.  First, the firm conducts the self-assessment or audit to 
systematically evaluate and improve practices within the organization.170  
Second, the public possesses a strong interest in encouraging parties to 
undertake critical evaluations that promise to improve the delivery of legal 
services and ethical conduct within law firms.171  Third, it is likely that 
the possibility of discovery of unfavorable information would curtail risk-
averse lawyers from critically examining firm practices, procedures, and 
policies.172  Fourth, lawyers who conduct the examination should be 
prepared to demonstrate that they did so with the expectation of 
confidentiality and that they maintained the confidentiality.173 
Lawyers may be able to improve the likelihood of a court recognizing 
the self-critical analysis privilege by taking the following steps: 
 
(1)  maintaining the confidentiality of the audit process; 
(2)  writing the audit report in a general and evaluative manner; and 
(3)  minimizing specific factual data in the report.174 
 
Although these actions might put a firm in a better position to assert the 
self-critical analysis privilege, there is no guarantee that a court will shield 
information developed in the self-examination.  Therefore, lawyers and 
their firms should approach the process recognizing that there is a risk of 
discoverability. 
To eliminate the uncertainty related to the discoverability of self-
evaluation information, lawyers could follow the lead of the medical 
 
170. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983) 
(discussing the first factor); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto 
Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
271, 302 (1996) (explaining how the first factor works in tandem with the other three factors). 
171. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983) 
(illustrating the second factor); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto 
Themselves? An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
271, 302–03 (1996) (detailing the impact the second factor has on the entire analysis). 
172. See Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1983) 
(stating the third factor); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands Unto Themselves? 
An Empirical Study on Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 303 
(1996) (commenting on the impact the third factor has on the decision process). 
173. See Dowling, 971 F. 2d at 426 (discussing the importance of the expectation of privacy).  
To satisfy the last prerequisite, the firm should not share the results of the self-assessment with third 
persons, such as insurers, if doing so would jeopardize the protection of the self-critical assessment 
privilege. 
174. Stephen P. Pepe et al., Audit: Assessing Current Policies and Procedures Under Applicable 
Laws and Regulations, in CORP. COMPLIANCE SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE FAIR HIRING 
AND TERMINATION PROGRAM 3:14 (2010–2011 ed. 2010). 
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profession and seek statutory protection, similar to that afforded to 
medical peer-review communications.  All states now recognize a medical 
peer-review privilege to varying degrees.175  “Peer review is the process by 
which healthcare providers evaluate and assess deficiencies in the quality of 
physician services provided in the healthcare setting.”176  Peer-review 
information is protected to encourage healthcare providers to critically and 
candidly evaluate deficiencies in the quality of medical services, without 
the concern that information could later be used “in a medical malpractice 
case.”177  Although some might question whether the peer-review 
privilege fosters a “conspiracy of silence” among doctors, physicians 
maintain that protection is necessary to maximize the quality of care that 
patients receive.178 
Similarly, a statutory self-evaluation privilege for lawyers could serve the 
public interest by creating a comfort zone so that lawyers can critically 
examine and improve their practices without the fear of discovery.  
Recognizing the value of such a project, a group of risk management 
experts proposed a privilege for risk audits of law firms.179  “[The] 
proposal was created by a now defunct organization, The Lawyer Risk 
Management Association.”180  “The principal drafters were Margaret 
Hepper and James C. Belding, now at Aon Affinity Insurance Services . . .  
and Anthony E. Davis, now a partner in the Lawyers for the Profession® 
 
175. See Ann B. Clairbone et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-Based Purchasing in 
Healthcare, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 442, 470 (2009) (examining the impact peer review has had on the 
medical field); see also J. Matthew Anderson, The Medical Peer Review Privilege: Illustrative Cases of the 
Public Policy Supporting the Privilege and a Practical Approach to Presenting the Case for Protection, 46 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 95, 97–99 (2010) (discussing the scope and application of the 
privilege). 
176. Ann B. Clairbone et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-Based Purchasing in 
Healthcare, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 442, 470 (2009). 
177. See id. (“It serves to assure physicians that the peer review committee’s analysis of 
physician performance will not be used against such physicians in a medical malpractice case.”). 
178. Compare B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 
10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 160–61 (1984) (warning that the privilege has evolved into a vehicle that 
enables hospitals to conceal the evidence of their own neglect), with F. Dean Griffen, The Challenge 
to Confidentiality in Peer Review, AM. COLL. OF SURGEONS, DIVISION OF ADVOC. AND HEALTH 
POLICY, available at http://www.facs.org/ahp/proliab/0599a.html (last revised Oct. 28, 2011) 
(referring to peer review as “an important tool used to evaluate and maximize the quality of care that 
patients receive”). 
179. See Email from Anthony C. Davis to Susan Fortney (Nov. 8, 2013, 10:15 A.M.) (on file 
with the St. Mary’s Law Journal) (stating that the proposed privilege for risk audits was drafted in 
1997 by a now disbanded organization). 
180. Id.; Email from James C. Belding to Anthony C. Davis, (Nov. 8, 2013, 10:21 A.M.) (on 
file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal). 
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practice group of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.”181  As stated in the 
proposal’s Preamble, communications relating to “voluntary internal risk 
management audits” are “privilege[d] from discovery or use as evidence in 
any civil proceedings” so that lawyers are encouraged “to undergo 
voluntary internal risk management audits of their management 
policies.”182  After defining terms, the proposal sets forth the privilege as 
follows: “Any privileged information prepared in connection with or which 
directly relates to a risk management audit conducted in accordance with 
[the definitions] is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in any 
civil proceeding.”183  This proposal can serve as a model when advocating 
for an expanded self-critical analysis privilege to cover information 
developed in law firm audits and self-assessments.184 
 
181. Email from Anthony C. Davis to Susan Fortney, (Nov. 8, 2013, 10:15 A.M.) (on file with 
the St. Mary’s Law Journal); Email from James C. Belding to Anthony C. Davis, (Nov. 8, 2013, 
10:21 A.M.) (on file with the St. Mary’s Law Journal). 
182. Risk Management Audits for Lawyers and Law Firms; Privilege From Discovery and Use in 
Civil Proceedings, THE LAWYER RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, Draft (1997) (on file with the 
St. Mary’s Law Journal) (“This privilege does not exist with respect to lawyer discipline 
proceedings.”). 
183. See id. at Section 2 (clarifying that the privilege does not extend to firms’ records “not 
prepared as part of or in connection with the risk management audit”). 
184. The following is the text of the proposed privilege:  
Section 1. Definitions: 
 
(a) “Risk management audit” means a voluntary, internal assessment, evaluation or review 
that is performed by a lawyer or by a partner or shareholder of a law firm, an employee of 
the lawyer or law firm, or by a third party person or entity who conducts such audit or 
assists the law firm in the implementation of any finding or recommendation made in 
connection with such audit, and initiated by the principal, a partner or shareholder of the 
law firm for the purpose (i) of determining whether the systems, policies and procedures 
for the management of the law firm are adequate or appropriate to the needs of the law 
firm and meet requirements of professional responsibility or (ii) of implementing any 
finding or recommendation made in connection with such audit. 
 
(b) “Risk management audit report” means any report, whether written or oral, prepared 
or communicated as a result of or in response to a risk management audit.  A risk 
management audit report may include the following supporting information, if prepared 
or developed for the primary purpose and in the course of an audit: notes and records of 
observations, findings, opinions, suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda, computer-
generated or electronically recorded information, and surveys. 
 
(c) “Privileged information” means a risk management audit report and any information, 
opinion, communication, report or record, whether written or oral, to which the 
evidentiary privilege attaches pursuant to Section 2 (a) of this Act. 
 
(d) “Civil proceeding” and “civil action” mean any civil litigation, including but not 
limited to any alternative dispute resolution procedure.  “Civil proceeding” and “civil 
action” does not mean lawyer professional discipline proceedings, with respect to which 
the privilege established by Section 2 (a) of this Act shall not apply. 
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 CONCLUSION: BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS AMONG PRACTITIONERS, 
REGULATORS AND INSURERS 
Regulators, bar leaders, and legal ethics experts around the world are 
monitoring the Australian experience with management-based regulation 
of lawyers.  The Australian statute allowing non-lawyer ownership of law 
firms effectively pushed incorporated firms to develop their ethical 
infrastructures.  First, the law requires that the firms appoint a legal 
practitioner director to be responsible for ethical conduct within the 
organization.  Second, it requires that incorporated firms implement and 
 
 
Section 2. Privilege In Civil Proceedings 
 
(a) Any privileged information prepared in connection with or which directly relates to a 
risk management audit conducted in accordance with Section 1 of this Act is not subject 
to discovery or admissible in evidence in any civil proceeding.  Information, documents or 
other records otherwise existing and available as part of the records of the law firm and not 
prepared as part of or in connection with a risk management audit are not privileged in a 
civil proceeding merely because such information, documents or records were presented or 
considered in connection with a risk management audit. 
 
(b) No person shall be required to disclose by way of testimony or otherwise or to produce 
under subpoena or otherwise any protected information, and no such privileged 
information may be used in connection with any civil action or proceeding, or in any 
discovery procedure in any civil action or proceeding. 
 
Section 3. Exception: Waiver 
 
(a) The privilege established by Section 2 of this Act does not apply to the extent the 
privilege is expressly waived by any person with authority to do so on behalf of the law 
firm that ordered the risk management audit report or caused the risk management audit 
to be conducted. 
 
(b) Disclosure of any privileged information does not waive the privilege established by 
Section 2 of this Act if the disclosure is made: 
 
(i) to a person to whom the audit results are disclosed and who is either the 
principal, a partner, shareholder or the employee of a law firm in connection with 
whose professional practice the risk management audit was conducted; 
 
(ii) to a legal representative of a person included within paragraph (1) hereinabove; 
 
(iii) to an employee of a person or entity that receives any privileged information, in 
the ordinary course of business and who or which is engaged in the business of 
obtaining or placing professional liability insurance coverage or which is engaged in 
the business of insuring, underwriting, or indemnifying attorneys; or 
 
(iv) subject to the terms of a confidentiality agreement between the lawyer or the 
law firm which ordered the risk management audit or caused the risk management 
audit to be conducted and a third party where such disclosure is made to such third 
party for the purpose of obtaining advice or assistance from such third party in the 
implementation of any finding or recommendation made in connection with a risk 
management audit report.  
Id. at Section 1 to Section 3.  
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maintain AMS.  Because the statute does not define the systems or manner 
for determining compliance, the regulator worked with interested parties, 
including practitioners and legal malpractice insurers, to develop a 
regulatory regime.  In collaboration, stakeholders developed ten objectives 
of good practice as well as an SAP for incorporated firms to evaluate and 
rate their compliance with the objectives.  This process enables lawyers to 
systematically learn about management controls and obtain guidance from 
the regulators. 
Early studies evaluating the “education toward compliance” approach 
revealed a relationship between firms’ completion of the self-assessment 
process and a significant reduction of the number of complaints filed 
against lawyers in the firm.  To obtain more data on the effects of the self-
assessment process, I conducted a two-phase study.  As discussed above, 
the study revealed that the self-assessment process contributed to 
development of management systems within firms.  The greatest reported 
impact was on firm management and risk management.  Taken together, 
results from these studies make a compelling case for implementing 
proactive approaches to regulation. 
Implementation of management-based principles can help transform a 
lawyer disciplinary system from a reactive one to a proactive one that 
educates and assists lawyers in conducting their practices ethically and 
efficiently.  To start the process of integrating management-based 
approaches, regulators and insurers can encourage self-assessment and 
educational initiatives to assist lawyers in improving their management 
practices, avoiding complaints, and lowering malpractice exposure.  They 
should create programs and incentives for lawyers to examine their firms’ 
practices and controls.  At the same time, they should seek to address 
disincentives, such as the risk of discoverability from results of the self-
examination or audit. 
The steps outlined in Part III of this Article can help regulators and 
insurers reshape their relationships with lawyers and the public.  Through 
educational programs, insurers and regulators work with lawyers—not 
against them.  They effectively partner with lawyers in assisting them to 
develop management systems and practice controls.  This approach 
promises to protect the public more than the current disciplinary system in 
which aggrieved persons obtain limited assistance and redress.  Rather than 
relying on a reactive system that processes complaints after misconduct 
occurs, clients and the public will fare much better if regulators and 
insurers work with firm and bar leaders to create programs that help 
lawyers improve their practices by avoiding problems before they happen. 
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